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Abstract
We believe, in the sense of supporting ideas and considering them cor-
rect while dismissing doubts about them. We take sides about ideas and
theories as if that was the right thing to do. And yet, from a rational
point of view, this type of support and belief is not justifiable at all. The
best we can hope when describing the real world, as far as we know, is
to have probabilistic knowledge, to have probabilities associated to each
statement. And even that can be very hard to achieve in a reliable way.
Far worse, when we defend ideas and believe them as if they were true,
Cognitive Psychology experiments show that we stop being able to ana-
lyze the question we believe at with competence. In this paper, I gather
the evidence we have about taking sides and present the obvious but un-
seen conclusion that these facts combined mean that we should actually
never believe in anything about the real world, except in a probabilistic
way. We must actually never take sides because taking sides destroy out
abilities to seek for the most correct description of the world. That means
we need to start reformulating the way we debate ideas, from our teaching
to our political debates, if we actually want to be able to arrive at the best
solutions as suggested by whatever evidence we might have. I will show
that this has deep consequences on a number of problems, ranging from
the emergence of extremism to the reliability of whole scientific fields. In-
ductive reasoning requires that we allow every idea to make predictions so
that we may rank which ideas are better and that has important conse-
quences in scientific practice. The crisis around p-values is also discussed
and much better understood under the light of this paper results. Finally,
I will debate possible ideas to try to minimize the problem.
1 Introduction
We believe. We believe in the honesty of certain people and in the dishonesty
of others. We may believe we are loved. Some of us believe in deities, some
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believe in political or economical ideas, some believe in scientific results. We
have beliefs on how the world ought to be and, at least for those beliefs, we are
often very aware that reality does not correspond to them. But we also hold
beliefs about the actual state of the world. And sometimes these beliefs are so
strong that we feel justified in saying that we know. Even when they are not that
strong, we often choose to say and defend those beliefs as if they were indeed
true. We can also hold beliefs about abstract entities that do not actually exist
in the world outside our minds and languages, such as numbers or deities. We
make claims of knowledge, and we expect to have real knowledge, to the point
that in Logic, it is often considered that the phrase “Someone knows p” means
that p is actually true [1]. The beliefs we defend have a vast importance in all
social aspects of human life. We have several organizations based on the spread
of ideas, on defending the beliefs that the people in those organizations hold to
be true, as if they were superior to everyone else’s beliefs. We join groups that
share our beliefs and we fight (sometimes only verbally) those we disagree with.
But, as we will see, taking sides is not only logically wrong, it also makes us
dumb, as experiments have been showing lately.
The actual question of what beliefs and knowledge are is and old and, maybe
surprisingly, a still open problem in Philosophy [2]. The concept of belief seems
so natural that we have never really doubted its usefulness and we only tried to
understand and define it properly. But, when we have asked what knowing and
believing are, we have usually been forced to ask if knowledge is even possible
or if Skepticism [3] is actually unavoidable. And yet, whenever we have taken
a position that did not included the hardest forms of Skepticism, the concept
that we would accept some ideas and reject others have come naturally. We
do not question it. This concept, accepting and rejecting ideas about the real
world, seems very natural and, indeed, it has survived for a long time without
being properly challenged. It could be the case we have never challenged it
just because it is too obviously right. But it is a scientist duty to ask if this is
indeed the case. And, when asking that question, we must acknowledge that
the concept might just feel obvious as consequence of some very deep instincts
we have.
Indeed, recent results and experiments in Cognitive Psychology point to se-
rious problems with the way we naturally work with our beliefs and how we
update them. Our many flaws in reasoning have led to the conclusion that the
main function of our reasoning might not to make better decisions. Our reason-
ing about ideological issues does seem to come in packages better described as
irrationally consistent [4]. Instead of looking for truth and correctness, it seems
clear now we use it to win arguments [5, 6] and to protect our own cultural
identity[7]. Looking for the correct or best answer might even be irrelevant
in too many cases and, at best, a possible use for our reasoning skills that is
nothing more than a side effect of the motives that have led evolution to give
us something we call reason and the ability to argument. Our reasoning skills
seem to have social purpose as their most important, central function. Their
main function seems to be to allow us to identify and defend the ideas of those
groups that define the way we see ourselves.
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These results pose interesting questions about the way we work and defend
our most fundamental beliefs, the same beliefs that we feel define who we are.
Since we do not use our reasoning to find the truth under these circumstances,
a natural question we should ask but usually avoid is how we could counter this
insidious bias. But even this question might not address the problem fully. A
more meaningful and complete question could actually challenge the very idea
that we should have identity-defining beliefs. That is the point of view I will
defend in this paper. Evidence shows clearly that when we embrace an idea,
be it a religion or a political ideology, our brains start working to defend our
interest and that what we are interested is to advance the cause of the ideas and
sides we chose, instead of looking for the correct answers. While it is not clear
if this could pose a problem for moral issues, where no correct answer is known
to exist, we do have a problem when confronted with any type of ideologies
that has claims on how the world actually works. Here, I will show that why
we should make very strong efforts to avoid those types of belief, that we really
should not take sides. In Section 2, I will present the problem as we know it
now. I will review some of the evidence that shows our many reasoning errors
and biases and proceed to investigate, from a normative point of view, if there
is any reason to hold and defend beliefs.
In Section 3, I will show that our taking sides also have very important effects
of the appearance and maintaining of extremism. I will investigate, by using
the tools of Opinion Dynamics [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] how the way we treat beliefs
can have a profoundly deep impact on the extremism of our own thoughts. And
how a subtle change in the way we think about problems, in particular if we are
look for absolute or proportional answers, can have an absurdly strong effect
on extremism. To explore this problem, I will investigate the effects of two
possible causes: the differences that arise from communication methods where
uncertainties are expressed, and the differences on how strong opinions can
become based on how our own internal expectations about the information we
obtain. As we will see, the simulations presented here will make a very strong
case in favor of why we must change the way we deal with beliefs, not only
to become better when looking for true or best answers (as if was not already
reason enough) but also to avoid extremism. The simulations will show that,
regardless of the way information is presented, what actually drives extremism is
the expectation to find a definitive single answer instead of being satisfied with
a mixed result where two competing ideas can add something to final solution.
In Section 4, I will address the consequences for scientific practice in general
that we can learn from the conclusion that we must not take sides and must not
hold identity-defining beliefs about the real world mean. As we will see, avoiding
taking sides can help correct some problems we still have with the reliability
of the scientific enterprise. Basically, the question of whether or not scientific
knowledge can be considered more reliable (or, better yet, far more reliable) than
any other kind of knowledge is one that many people consider settled. And yet
many of those people who think they know the answer strongly disagree with
each other. They take sides and defend those sides. Individual points of view
vary as widely as from considering that all scientific knowledge is no more valid
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than any other type of opinion, as in some wild interpretations that followed
the proposals in the Strong Program in the Sociology of Knowledge[14], to very
strong realistic beliefs that we are actually uncovering the true laws of Universe.
Or even bolder positions that allow Stephen Hawking to claim, maybe as a joke,
that he believes Roger Penrose to be a Platonist[15]. While it would make no
sense to deny that actual scientists are human beings and, therefore, subjects to
our failures and all types of social pressure, it also makes no sense to deny the
incredible achievements we have and attribute them to sheer luck. Still, we will
have already learned that we should be quite wary of ideas so strongly defended
by their proponents as those of both sides of the debate do. It might indeed
be wiser to learn which aspects of the best description of the problem each of
the sides got right. In the terminology of Section 3, we should strive here to be
mixers instead of wishers.
That we have sent probes to the outer reaches of the Solar System, that
we have eliminated diseases and dangers and we live much longer than we used
to just a couple of centuries ago are clear indications that we must be doing
something right. On the other hand, if we consider the notion that, from a
rational point of view, we should not take sides and that, when we do, those
beliefs can seriously compromise our ability to reason, we do have a solid cause
to be concerned about scientific work (or any work that requires intellect).
Indeed, instead of a cold and strictly rational relationship with the word of
ideas, scientists are actually quite passionate about what their defend. Worse
yet, we now have access to data that points to the fact that stronger intellects
might actually show stronger polarization of opinion effects[16]. This suggests
that more intelligent people use their intelligence not for finding the truth or
even simply to honestly test ideas. Instead, once more, it seems we all use our
brain powers to protect the things we believe in and, the larger the brain power,
the better defense one can prepare. But, maybe a little unexpectedly, this effect
can be even stronger, the better prepared an individual is. At one side, we
have our achievements to tell we are doing something right, at the other side,
evidence that consensus might just be a social construct.
An analysis of the question on what Science can prove from a logical point
of view does not get us more confident, if we only use a deductive point of view.
Popper idea of falseability [17] was indeed based on the trivial logical fact that
when a theory makes a prediction, just observing the prediction holds provides
no proof at all that the theory is right. On the other hand, if the prediction fails,
we do know that, since the conclusions were wrong, something must be wrong
with the premises. For Popper, that meant that, after proper checks for other
possibilities, the theory had to be false. But that is actually only true if too
many other conditions are met. First, there must be absolutely no chance for
experimental error. And it must also be the case that you consider as theory the
whole set of ideas you used to make the prediction, including every detail about
the Universe you assumed during your calculations. If you use a more traditional
meaning to the word theory, Popper idea that a theory can be proved false is just
wrong from a strict deductive point of view [18, 19]. The discovery of Neptune
is the classical example of a prediction (the movement of Uranus) that was
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wrong not because the theory of Newtonian Gravity was failing. Uranus did not
behave the way the theory predicted because there was another unknown planet
we did not know at the time, Neptune. Neptune gravitational influence could
not have been considered in the calculations before its existence was known.
Auxiliary hypothesis like the structure of the Solar System are not considered
part of Newtonian mechanics or any theory of Gravity. The actual failure of
any predictions can be due to the theory we are testing being wrong, of course.
But the failure can also be caused by many other hypothesis we had to make
to obtain the predictions. That is, from a strictly deductive point of view, we
can not hope to prove any theories neither right nor wrong. The existence
of Neptune was verifiable and, therefore, it might seem at first that we could
actually have disproved Newtonian Mechanics if Neptune did not exist [20]. But
other hypothesis could have been made then. And, at the very least, any real
calculation always involves approximations in the description of the real world.
As such, we never really have what would have been an exact prediction from the
theory. There will always be the possibility that a new, unthought hypothesis
could save any given theory.
The real problem is, of course, as we will see in Section 2, the fact that
Deduction can not actually tells us anything about the real world. This is true
for scientific reasoning, just as it is true for any other kind of reasoning. Instead,
we need inductive tools to estimate which theory is more likely to describe
the world correctly. Indeed, more current descriptions of scientific work have
proposed that scientist would behave as if they were Bayesian agents, an idea
known as Confirmation Theory [21, 22, 23]. While this is a solid prescription
for how scientists should behave, there is actually little evidence that scientists
reason better than any other intelligent person. While a Bayesian description
does capture the qualitative aspects of our reasoning nicely [24, 25], we know
we actually fail at most probability estimates[26, 27, 28]. Indeed, since the first
experiments on how we humans change opinions when presented new data, it
has been observed that we have a strong tendency to keep our old opinions,
even when we already are talking about probabilistic opinions, a bias known
as conservatism [29]. It is quite likely that scientists would exactly the same,
even more when we consider that specialists in an area are better equipped to
actually defend their points of view, despite the fact that they should actually
test those points of view, instead of defending them. This means that it is
reasonable to expect that we will have problems in Science, problems caused by
the human failures and biases described in this paper. Therefore, we must ask
whether these problems might be minimized by some of the characteristics of
the scientific work, by social effects, or not at all. If they are, understanding
which characteristics are important for that minimization of the problem could,
in principle, help us improve the way we reason, as scientists, as citizens, and
in our general lives. If it is not, we must learn to improve and correct the ways
we, scientists, work.
We already know that previous observations of scientific work have suggested
that scientists break some expected norms all the time. Surprisingly, we will see
that part of this non-compliance is actually in complete accordance to normative
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Bayesian reasoning and it might actually be one reason why some areas are
quite successful in explaining their objects of study. I will show that, while
those observations, when they were first made, were considered evidence that
we should adopt a vision where all ideas are equally valid, this proposed (and
quite damaging) Relativism is not justified at all. The concept that we should
accept the creation of new ideas, regardless of how much they contradict what
we currently know is actually a good prescription. But Induction dictates that
all these ideas must be ranked in a probabilistic way and that means they will
not be equal at all. That quite obviously means that some ideas will be far more
probable than others. In particular, there will be theories that we can claim,
in a harmless abuse of language, that we have proved to be wrong. The abuse
comes from the fact that there will always remains a technical, ridiculously
small probability that they might actually be true. On the other hand, ideally,
we have to remember that we should keep even those theories as very remote
possibilities. It is always justified to discard them in cases where our limitations
dictate we can not consider all possibilities and must focus only on the more
probable ideas, of course. But, from a scientific and epistemological point of
view, no idea can actually be discarded by data and they should survive in a
limbo of basically useless concepts. And that means, among other things, that
we actually need pure theorists in every mature area and those theorists should
be capable of providing testable predictions.
Finally, not taking sides has also another very important consequence on how
we should analyze data. We have created and we have promoted the widespread
use of statistical tools that have the objective of discarding hypotheses. Far
worse, we have made those tools central to the whole process of acceptance of
ideas in some areas of knowledge. This human desire to know the absolute truth
and avoid dealing with the undesired uncertainty of the probabilities is at the
very core of the whole problem caused by the widespread use of p-values and tests
of hypothesis that now we know are making whole fields of knowledge far less
trustworthy than we can tolerate. We must learn fast that we cause too much
harm by using techniques aimed at excluding ideas, instead of ranking them.
And we must change as fast as possible what is considered proper statistical
techniques since many of those techniques only make our biases and desire to
defend an idea a much stronger problem.
2 Why we should not hold any beliefs at all
2.1 Individual and Group Reasoning
That we humans fail at reasoning far more often than we would like to believe is
now a well established result. The so called paradoxes of choice of Allais [30] and
Ellsberg [31] have shown that our decision making is not rational, in the sense
that it can not be described by a simple maximization of any utility function.
We actually behave as if any probability value told to us were subject to the
application of a weighting function before we use the value to make any decisions
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[32, 33]. Among other things, that means we overestimate the probability of
unlike events. We see correlations in data when there is none simply because
they seem to make sense [34] and fail to see them when they are surprising [35].
We interpret probabilistic information too badly, even in professional settings.
To the point that we already have efforts to improve the understanding of basic
probabilistic concepts among health professionals [36].
Since the first experiments with probabilistic choices, scientists have also
explored other aspects of our reasoning with results that can be considered
even more disturbing. We actually fail at very trivial logical problems [37, 38]
and we provide different answers to the same question simply because it was
framed differently [39]. We are not even aware of how badly we reason, we
overestimate our chances to get correct answers [40], with the possible excep-
tion of the cases when we are actually really good at those specific questions,
when underestimation of successes can happen [41]. These two effects combined
can generate a dangerous combination of overconfidence among the incompe-
tent and underconfidence among competent people and the consequences of this
could be potentially disastrous. A curse of incompetence seems to plague us in
some areas, and this can be particularly hard to notice for the cases where the
competence to perform a task and the competence to know if we are competent
are exactly the same ones. That basically makes it impossible for those who are
not trained to actually know that they should know better, since they lack the
competence to judge their own competence [42]. And there is more. Sometimes,
as for example when presented with new information about a problem, we can
become more certain of our answers even when we are making actual worse
evaluations [43]. When reasoning in groups, we, at least, have mixed, good and
bad, results. Our combined reasoning can indeed be more solid under some
circumstances, a phenomenon known as the wisdom of the crowds [44]. But
interaction and social pressures inside groups can actually make groups reason
far more poorly than individuals [45, 46]. Social pressure can make us fail even
in absurdly easy tasks almost nobody would get wrong, as shown, already in
1955, by the Ash experiments [47, 48].
The combination of all these experiments paints a very grim scenario about
our reasoning skills. When compared to all our accomplishments as a species,
it should be clear that a part of the answer is missing. More specifically, how
and why we can be so bad at reasoning as we actually are and still have ad-
vanced to heights no other species could either dream of. Of course, there is
another side to this story, important facts that makes us sound less utterly
incompetent. In particular, there are fundamental issues associated with the
fact that information processing is a costly effort. More brain power requires
more energy consumption. That means that theoretically optimal decision rules
might not be ideal in the real world, where a compromise between effort and
correctness might be the actual ideal [49]. So, if there are situations when we
can get a reasonably good answer most of the time with less effort, by using
some simplified rule of thumb, that informationally cheap answer might be the
optimal solution in the evolutive problem, even if it is not the most accurate
answer to the problem. By spending less energy thinking, it might have been in
7
our best interest to do not explore the problem further when a decent answer
is available [50]. Indeed, there are quite simple heuristics that have been shown
to be very effective [51, 52] at giving good, reliable answers. Our brains might
just be looking for workable approximations, not the correct ones. Indeed, our
reasoning seems to be clearly not well adjusted to logical problems at all, not
without some amount of real previous training. But, while we are naturally
incompetent at solving novel logical problems when formally identical problems
using situations we are familiar with are presented, we are actually quite good at
solving them [53]. Even our probabilistic biases can actually be understood as
reasoning that is similar to a Bayesian inference problem [25] where we correct
the probability values we hear assuming they might be just an estimate [24]. It
is in new problems, those far from our daily life, that we seem to fail even in
the simplest questions. The worrisome thing to notice here is that all scientific
advance happens far from problems we are familiar with the answers.
More recently, a very interesting answer to why we actually reason and,
therefore, why we seem to have so many biases and do so many mistakes, have
started to become clear. While reasoning can actually be used for looking for
correct answers, this might not be its primary function. The ability to look
for correct answers might even be just a luck accidental consequence of our
actual need and use for reasoning. The more we learn, the more it seems we
use reasoning mostly as a tool for winning arguments [5, 6]. When we have one
central belief we defend, one idea we want to claim right, we tend to believe in
everything that would support that conclusion and deny everything that would
go against it, even when those beliefs are logically independent [4]. The central
point here is that winning an argument does not necessarily means being correct.
Not at all, it just means we want to convince the listeners or be convinced by
them. When there is already agreement, there would be no need for further
exploration of the problem. That explains the very well known confirmation bias
[54] where people tend to look solely for information that confirms what they
already think. Interestingly, this tendency to use reason mainly as a social tool
to convince others is a result that appears to be universal, and not dependent on
specific cultures [55]. That is, the real function of our reasoning abilities would
be the social one. Our quest for truth, the function we would like to believe,
might have nothing to do with our reasoning. Of course, winning arguments
is not something we all can do. There has to be something a little more to it
and we can guess what it could be if we realize that when someone inside a
group wins an argument, whomever that person is, the whole group will tend
to shift to a common opinion everyone will hold. That opinion can eventually
be associated with that group, even to to the point of being a way to identify
the people who belong to that group.
We must also realize that our reasoning flaws are not restricted to our every-
day problems, with no influence on expert opinions or how they are perceived.
We already have evidence that the public perception of scientists opinions can
be quite wrong exist in several issues, such as global warming[56] or the dis-
posal of nuclear waste [57]. Kahan et al have observed that even the way we
perceive whether there is a scientific consensus on a specific question is influ-
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enced by which behaviors we find socially acceptable and which behaviors we
believe are socially detrimental[7]. We know we value consistency in our beliefs
to the point that the set of beliefs we adhere to can be more easily described
as irrationally consistent [4], since we accept independent ideas as a package,
put together for one sole purpose, that they support a conclusion we wish to be
true. We call these packages ideologies and we take sides and defend them. We
often define who we are based on the ideologies we prefer. But, by doing so,
we condemn ourselves, even the brightest ones among ourselves, to irrationality
and stupidity. Indeed, there is now good evidence that our reasoning works in
an identity-protective way[58]. Given the amount of already existent evidence
on how our sides influence our reasoning, Kahan has proposed that information
should always be presented in ways that are compatible with the values and
positions of the listener, in order to allow that new information to be absorbed
and analyzed with less prejudice [59]. The cleverer we are, the better we can
create arguments to defend our identities and the harder it may be to learn we
are actually wrong! That suggests once more that, when facing problems that
are associated with the ways we define ourselves, the function of our reasoning is
not to find correct answers. Instead, its real function is to protect that identity,
to protect our group and our side of the discussion. That includes, as we have
discussed, forming arguments that support our views. Indeed, tests of how sci-
entific literacy as well as numeracy correlate with beliefs about climate change
among member of the public showed that those who scored higher on literacy
and numeracy presented the strongest cases of cultural polarization [16]. The
increased skills actually allow people to defend their chosen positions better,
instead of making them better at analyzing the literature and the evidence.
The conclusion we can arrive from those observations is a scary one. Brilliant
individuals who take sides might not be trustworthy about their opinions at
all. Their arguments might be worth listening to and analyzing. But their final
conclusions must be seen as irrelevant, at least when they show certainty.
2.2 Normative Reasoning
Certainty (or the desire for certainty) is indeed a central part of the problem.
We, as scientists, should want our reasoning to help us to arrive at the right
answers, we assume that is what reasoning does, instead of simply being a tool
to advance the goals of our own specific social group. That is something we
already believe to be fundamental. Since commitment to one idea seems to
make all of us reason poorly, it makes sense to ask if we should not just get rid
of such commitments. To move forward in answering this question, we must
now ask if, from a normative, logical point of view, such commitments even
make sense. It is true that we are so used to choosing ideas and defending them
that we do not even question if we should keep doing it. We do not ask if there
are better alternatives, we have never questioned if the concept of taking sides
might not just be plainly wrong. But that is exactly what we need to do.
Defending an idea would make sense if we knew it to be THE truth. So,
the first thing to consider is if, when we claim to believe in something, we are
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actually saying we have concluded that something is true. That we know it to
be true, correct, and not either an error nor a deception. There is, of course,
a weaker meaning to the word believe, as when we say “I believe it will rain
tomorrow”. In this case, we are not really claiming knowledge, we are just
making a statement that can be loosely described as probabilistic, despite the
fact that no probability was mentioned. Still, there is clear uncertainty in the
phrase. As such, this is not the meaning we are interested about, since our
social group will not suffer and our identity will not be threatened at all if it
turns out we were wrong. We do not really take sides on those questions and
we easily accept those beliefs can be wrong. It is when believing is used as if
it meant knowing that we can be in trouble. Therefore, that is the meaning we
must investigate.
The problem of what knowing something means is actually a very old philo-
sophical question. And, despite several attempts at defining the meaning of
knowing something, no clear answer has ever been reached. Apparently reason-
able answers, such as the concept of justified true belief, are known to have flaws
and exception cases that make them not a real correct answer [60]. Deductive
Logic exists at least for as long as since Aristotle, allowing us to make proofs
where no doubt exist, but only as long as we do not doubt the premises. Newer,
more complete, and better versions of Deductive Logic have appeared but they
all depend on what you accept initially as true. There is always the need to
already believe some initial concepts as true in order to use the logical tools,
just as we need postulates to start any kind of mathematical thought. First
truths seem to be unreachable by any Deductive Logic, as far as we know to-
day. We can prove conclusions, we can not prove premises, not unless we make
more primitive premises. So, we must ask how can we ever accept those initial
premises, how we can ever learn something about the real world.
The form of reasoning we have that allows us to accept propositions about
the real world is Induction. As far as we know, it is as old as Deduction, but
it has never led to certainties. Indeed, it is based, among other things, on the
assumption that the patterns we have observed in the past will be repeated in
the future. And that assumption will not be true in every situation [61, 62].
While it is reasonable to expect Gravity to keep working as it has always done
(we do not know it will, Induction offers no proof of it, but that conclusion is
still very reasonable), there are actually areas of knowledge where expecting the
future to strongly resemble the past sounds as an absurd, such as technology,
the behavior of financial markets where completely new products are always
been created, or the evolution of our own societies and economies as more and
more types of work can be replaced by machines. Induction can still be useful in
these cases, as we try to understand some underlying laws that might be more
basic than the superficial data but doubts always remain.
Indeed, from what we have learned so far about its uses, inductive reasoning
can be a powerful and very useful tool, but it means that the desire for knowing
the truth must be abandoned. In its place, a probabilistic approach, where we
only estimate the likelihood that a given statement is true, is required. How to
estimate those probabilities and change them as we learn more can be a very
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difficult task in real problems, but, at least in theory, we have the prescription
for how it must be done. More than that, it is interesting to notice that different
assumptions on the same problem of how induction should be performed lead
to the same rule for changing probabilities as we learn more about the world[63,
64, 65]. We just need to apply a deceptively simple probability rule known
as the Bayes Theorem. However, despite Bayes Theorem apparent simplicity,
using it in the context of real problems is almost never easy. Far from it, we still
are plagued with a large number of unsolved problems, some of them related to
the specification of initial knowledge, others about the models about the world
that are required to use the theorem for an actual complete description of the
possible theories about the world.
An approach that is equivalent to the Bayesian method was proposed fifty
years ago by Solomonoff [66]. This approach sheds some very interesting light
on the full requirements of the Bayesian Induction. For a full analysis of any
problem, our probabilistic Induction would require both infinite information
processing abilities to generate all possible explanations that are compatible
with the data we have, as well infinite memory to deal with all those explana-
tions and use them to calculate its predictions. While those requirements do
not make Bayesian methods wrong nor useless, they do mean that even when
estimating probabilities, the best we can hope for is an approximation to the
actual probability values. Uncertainty remains even about the “real” probabil-
ity values and better methods to estimate uncertainty can always be created to
get us a little closer to the best possible answer.
The state of the area and the technical difficulties of actually using those
methods are interesting problems, but beyond the scope of this paper. What
matters here is that we have learned that, given our current state of knowledge
in Deductive and Inductive Logics, probabilistic beliefs about the world actually
make normative sense but certainties do not. That is exactly the way Bayesian
methods work. While we sometimes use the word belief in a probabilistic sense
that fits very well with inductive considerations (I believe I will get that job),
there are also times when we use the word belief as a weird claim of unjustified
certainty. There are times when we decide to take sides about things we can not
be certain about. When we say someone believes in some set of religious claims
or in an ideology, for example, we are often saying that person consider those
sets of claims to actually be true. Some people would agree that certainty is not
really warranted but that the set of beliefs is that individual best guess, a guess
that person is willing to defend. And that willingness to defend an idea is far
stronger than claiming we just think the idea to be very probable. It is one thing
to behave like that in moral issues. It is a completely different problem to do the
same on descriptions of the world. The world is the way it is, regardless of what
we think or feel about it. To make strong statements about the world, when
those statements are simply not warranted should be considered a serious form
of irrationality. And a damaging one, since our own psychological characteristics
will make those choices turn us into far less intelligent versions of ourselves.
Things get even weirder when we notice that most sets of beliefs are actually
logically inconsistent, with huge holes that their defenders prefer to ignore. Still,
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even if they were not inconsistent, we would still have problems, as we do not
have the tools to say we know the truth on the claims they make about the
real world. There is nothing in our current logical or philosophical knowledge
that says that certainties such as those are even remotely possible. What we do
know is that belonging to a group, any group, can make sense as a social choice
and that this belonging affects our intellect. Accepting the group premises as
true, whatever those premises are, on the other hand, is actually an irrational
choice. We are probably far more efficient truth-seekers if we never take sides
in this kind of irrational battles.
2.3 Psychology experiments and Logic combined
It is worth to review the argument, and put it all together now. Actively
believing and defending an idea brings a series of negative consequences to our
ability to pursue the truth. While defending our points of view, experiments
show that we accept concepts simply because they support the conclusions we
wish were true. At the same time, we submit the ideas that we disagree to
an actual rational analysis, looking for possible errors. We value the ideas we
believe in ways that resemble an endowment effect [67], where we value the same
object much more if it is our possession. While the experiments conducted so
far were focused mostly on political views and popular opinions about scientific
issues, their results seem consistent enough. That consistency makes it very
reasonable to expect the same problem should be observed in any ideas we
claim to believe. Indeed, that is exactly the way the world seems to operate.
The special case of moral beliefs could be treated apart, as it might, at
least in theory, be possible that a person actually knows her moral preferences.
But we have a serious problem when we consider beliefs about the real world.
The choice of one idea over another is never justified from a rational point of
view, at least not to the point of certainty. In situations of limited resources,
choosing one idea because we have no time to consider all other alternatives is
a perfectly rational choice. For example, choosing one treatment for a patient
is necessary, but that does not mean that we decide all other possible illnesses
must be wrong. We just decide the best current course of action, based on
the chances we estimate for each disease and how serious their consequences
might be. That means that the correct thing to do is not taking sides and
defend one specific diagnosis, the decisions we make today in this case must be
subject to future change, as we learn more. It is very clear that any physician
who would choose one initial diagnosis and then simply defend that choice and
never change it should be considered incompetent, damaging and dealt with
accordingly. Things are not different for any other area of knowledge. Decision
making is fundamental and unavoidable. But we do have the tools to deal with
decision problems involving uncertainty.
Of course, this whole analysis assumes the debate is happening between
knowledgeable, honest people. When debating people who refuses to even learn
about the evidence that already exists, taking sides might be almost unavoid-
able. But that should not mean defending one idea as true, even though things
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might look that way. It can be just a very basic defense of the need for rational
thinking as opposed to the very unreliable human thinking. In such cases, the
decision process might eveb tell us the best thing to do can be to take the side
of competence and clear logical thinking against cherry-picking tactics and cir-
cular reasoning. But it can also be true that the best tactics might be simply
to ignore the irrational debaters. The discussion in these cases actually needs
to be far more fundamental, if it will happen at all. It must actually be about
reasoning in minimally competent ways, about avoiding human biases, and also
looking at the real complete data before making a probabilistic estimate. Ratio-
nality requires us to consider every possible idea as a possibility, but some ideas
will be incredibly improbable. In any circumstances, however, if one group of
people simply choses one specific idea they will support and defend, regardless
of evidence and rational argumentation, the only possible next step might be to
label those individuals as irrational and ignore them, if possible. As they are
not looking for the truth, they are simply using our human very bad natural
reasoning to defend their group.
In all the necessary considerations, we should, of course, not forget that our
brains are limited machines. Some ideas are so improbable that we can claim
them wrong in any practical terms based on the evidence we have collected so
far (we will see an example in Section 4). In those cases, it will often make sense
to not consider concepts that we have sufficiently strong evidence to discard as
highly improbable when making decisions. But this is different from claiming
our ideas to be correct. Or even to claim certainty that the ideas we have dis-
carded are wrong, since it is always possible that new evidence might force us
to change our opinions in the future. We, scientists, claim to actually know
that and that fact that ideas might return and that we always should be open
to changing our minds when faced with that new evidence. However, experi-
ments show that by belonging to any group where an idea is defended we make
ourselves vulnerable to our human shortcomings. Observations of real scientists
working actually agree that we are not different from the picture that emerges
from the experiments. We are far too stubborn and we cling to the ideas we
defend despite evidence, as we will review in Section 4. We are not different and,
as any humans, we stop being truth-chasers and become idea-defenders. That
actually makes our individual opinions unreliable when we take sides. Anyone
that is out there defending an idea should actually be considered a non-reliable
source of information. That is why we must start as soon as possible to guard
ourselves against taking sides.
3 How the ways we handle beliefs and how we
communicate can influence extremism
Unfortunately, our desire to have one side to defend does not only makes us
unreliable. It can also be a fundamental factor in the appearance and spread
of extremist views. Extreme opinions can be observed in many different issues
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and they are often not a problem. While a very strong opinion is sometimes
warranted (for example, about not leaving the 20th floor by the window), there
are several other circumstances where the same strength of opinion makes no
sense, such as many problems where no scientific consensus exist. Even if we
could ignore the appalling influence of extremist opinions on terrorism and wars,
we would still be left with a series of problematic consequences associated with
too strong beliefs. As examples, we know that some types of extreme opinions
can cause serious problems in the democratic debates between the opposing
political parties [68] or in how minorities are perceived [69]. Understanding
extremism, how it starts and how it spread is obviously a very important issue.
One way that we have used to understand how extremism evolves is using
the tools provided by Opinion Dynamics [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] . Opinion Dynam-
ics basically study how opinions spread through a society of artificial agents,
whether those opinions can be classified as extreme ones or not. As such, it
can help us understand the factors that contribute to a person decision to hold
strong beliefs. In issues where there is actually no clear known answer, un-
derstanding the dynamics of how ideas spread and become stronger might, in
principle, help us prevent problems and mayve even avoid the loss of human
lives.
Previous works in the area have studied different aspects of the question,
always based on one specific ad-hoc model chosen by the authors of each paper.
In purely discrete models, although there is no strength of opinion, it is still
possible to introduce notions as inflexibles [70]. It is also possible to include
a larger than two number of possible opinions to better represent not only
the choices, but how strong they are [71, 72]. However, strength of opinion is
either not measured in those cases, or is limited to very few possible values.
It is, thus, necessary to have some continuous variable that will represent the
opinion about the issue we are studying if we really want to ask the question of
whether one specific agent could be considered an extremist. For that reason,
while discrete, Ising-like models[73] allow us to try to understand how inflexibles
agents can influence the opinion of the rest of the population, it still leaves
questions answered. Therefore, there is a larger number of studies in the area
that use as basis the Bounded Confidence (BC) models and their variations [12,
74]. One of the questions that have been investigated with the use of BC
models is how agents with extreme opinions, represented by values that are
close to the limits of the possible opinion values, can influence the rest of the
society [75, 76]. These studies included studying the effects on the spread of
extremism from factors such as the type of the network [77, 78], the uncertainty
of each agent [79], the influence of mass media [80], and the number of contacts
between individuals [81]. Consequences of extremism have also been studied in
this context, both negative, such as escalation in intergroup conflict [82] as well
as possible positive effects such as the possibility that extremism might help
maintain pluralism [83].
One limitation of the BC models for studying extremism is that, in most im-
plementations, an interaction either brings the agents to an intermediary opinion
or their opinions do not change at all. In other words, unless a mechanism for
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the strengthening of opinions is added by hand, opinions just don’t get stronger
than the initially existing ones in these models. Agents with already extreme
opinions have to be included in the initial conditions. On the other hand, in the
Continuous Opinions and Discrete Action (CODA) model [13, 84], it is perfectly
possible to start only with agents who have moderate initial opinions and, still,
due to their interactions and local reinforcement, those agents can and usually
do end up with very strong views. This was accomplished by combining the
notion of choice from discrete models with a continuous subjective probability
each agent holds about the possibility that each given choice might be the be
best one. By assigning a fixed probability that each neighbor might have cho-
sen the best possible choice, a trivial application of the Bayes Theorem yields a
simple additive model where extremism arises naturally [85]. The general idea
of using Bayesian rules as basis for Opinion Dynamics has been investigated and
it was observed that the generated models are actually a good description of
the real observed behavior [86]. And, while there is indeed strong evidence that
people do not update their opinions as strongly as they should, a bias known as
conservatism bias [87], several of our biases can actually be explained by more
detailed Bayesian reasoning, if the possibility of error in the information source
is included [24].
By separating the internal opinion from what other neighbors observe, CODA
model allows a better description of the inference process that underlies the for-
mation of opinions. Indeed, the way CODA was built can be used as a general
framework to produce different models [84]. These new models can be obtained
simply by changing the assumptions on how agents communicate, think or use
the information available to them. Indeed, traditional discrete models can be
obtained as a limit case of the situation where an agent considers its own in-
fluence on the opinion of its neighbors [88]. It is interting to notice that the
separation between internal opinion and communication is an important feature
that can be included in many different models [89]. And, if the communication
happens not in terms of choices but in terms of a continuous average estimate
of a parameter, the BC model can also be obtained as an approximation to a
Bayesian rule model [90]. Extensions of the CODA model were proposed to
study the emergence of inflexibles [91], the effects of several agents debating in
groups [92], as well as the effect that a lack of trust between the agents can
have on social agreement [93] and the effects of the motivation of the agents
[94]. Interestingly, for a completely different application, unrelated to social
problems, the same ideas can even be used to obtain simple behaviors of purely
physical systems, with properties such as inertia and the harmonic oscillator be-
havior arising from continuous time extension of Bayesian opinion models[95].
To answer the question of what factors might be more important in causing ex-
tremism, I will use the fact that the Bayesian framework behind CODA can be
trivially applied to describe differences in the way the agents think and behave.
That is, the framework allows us to describe both the communication process
as well as the assumptions of the agents. This will make it possible to explore
the circumstances where extremism is more likely to appear and make pinions
become too strong.
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One first observation that can already be obtained from the literature comes
from the fact that extremism usually does not develop from the interactions
in BC models, while it is prevalent in the CODA model. As in BC models
the agents observe a continuous value as the opinion of the agent they are
interacting with, a possible explanation for the lack of increase in extremism
could be associated with this different form of the communication. That is,
it makes sense to ask if the difference is in the communication process. In
one case, we only communicate continuous values, signaling doubt about the
discrete choices where only the supported option is shown. And perhaps the
difference in how extremism gets much stronger in CODA might be because
these expressed doubts could, in principle, help prevent extremism. In order to
check this possibility, a version of the CODA model where the actual probability
assigned to the two options is observed instead of the preferred choice will be
introduced. This will show very clearly that the solution for situations where we
want to avoid extremism is not in the communication process, as the new model
will lead to an actual strengthening of extremism. In this case, extremism will
actually even increase faster than the original CODA model.
On the other hand, a much more subtle but important difference between
CODA and BC models exist in the assumptions agents make about the problem.
In BC models, agents aim to find a continuous value. It is reasonable to think
they would be satisfied with an intermediary value and most of them quite often
do. In CODA, the question is changed to which of two options is the best one.
That means that there is a strong underlying assumption that a best answer
exists. However, the ideal quest for finding the best answer might not be well
described this way. It is perfectly reasonable to assume, in many cases, maybe
in most cases, that the optimal choice is not one or the other, but a mixture
of both, with proper weights. Examples are many. When choosing the best
food among two options, the optimal solution might be take 75% of the first
one and 25% of the second. In Politics, the optimal policy, when there are two
competing ideologies, could also be to use 50% of the ideas of each one of them.
And so on.
Such compromise is not included in the CODA model nor in the variation
I just mentioned. But it is central in BC models. In order to investigate this
effect, a second variation of CODA is proposed here, where the agents indeed
look for the correct proportion, instead of the correct option. We will see that, in
this case, while strong opinions still emerge, they are nowhere near the strength
of the two other versions of CODA and they might even be considered not really
extreme. This result shows very clearly how damaging it can be when we simply
want to believe in one idea or another, even before deciding which one, instead
of looking for the best compromise. In order to compare the effects of different
communicating styles with how aiming for certainty or accepting uncertainty
can influence extremism, all four cases will be discussed in this paper. Two of
the cases, the one with continuous communication with a decision between two
certainties, and the one with discrete observation where the agents accept the
whole continuous of uncertainty, are new and are actually introduced for the
first time here.
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3.1 The Models
While the first obvious difference between the BC and CODA models is what
agents observe in other agents, the assumptions about the mental model agents
have of the world are also subtly different. BC models assume the agents are
looking for a correct value inside a range, typically between 0 and 1. In CODA,
while the agents have a probabilistic estimate of the correctness of a choice
(therefore, also a number between 0 and 1), they hold the belief that only one
of the options can be true. In particular, by assigning a probability p to A
being the best choice and 1 − p to the alternative choice B, one is ignoring
the possibility that the ideal answer could be an ideal proportion f around
0.5. Instead, p only represents the chance that A is optimal. It makes sense to
investigate what happens if agents consider the optimal would be obtained as
a proportion f of A and a proportion 1 − f of B. While this might, at first,
sound very similar to the way CODA works, we get a subtle but very important
distinction. From a mathematical modeling point of view, the difference could
not be clearer. Instead of a probability p assigned to one specific result, the case
where all mixtures are acceptable requires a continuous distribution g(f) over
the space of proportions f , where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. To help the reader to know when I
am referring to each case, some terminology is needed. Therefore, from now on
I will refer to agents who look for a single isolated answer as certainty wishers
or, more simply, wishers. Those who accept that the best current answer can
be a mixture of both choices with a frequency to be determined will be called
mixers.
Of course, not only the mental model is important. If communication is
continuous (and honest, as we will assume all the time here), wishers will provide
the probability that A is the best choice, while mixers would give us their
estimate f of how much of A should be included in the optimal answer. But
communication can also happens in a discrete way, and that can be as simple as
picking a most likely choice for both agents. In this case, while using the same
rule (if p or f are larger or smaller than 0.5), wishers are picking the option they
believe more likely to be the best one, while mixers would be simply indicating
which option they expect would be present more strongly in the optimal answer.
To explore the difference in communication and mental expectations, we must
therefore investigate how extremism emerges in all combinations, represented
by the four cases bellow:
Certainty
wishers
Mixers
Discrete ob-
servation
CODA New model 2
Continuous
observation
New model 1 Bounded Confi-
dence (BC)
Notice that every model in this table will involve continuous variables. It is
what is observed (observation) and what is expected of them (choice) that can
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be either discrete or continuous. The literature already shows very clearly the
effects of CODA and BC models on extremism. In order to explore all these
cases, we must, therefore learn how extremism evolves in the two new cases.
To make the comparison more natural, a generative framework for different
models is necessary. As we have seen, extensions of the CODA model did
generate such a framework[84] and the ideas in the framework have been used
to obtain a version of the BC models that agree qualitatively with its results[90].
Therefore, we can simply refer to the known BC results from the literature as
if they had been generated by the same framework and investigate here the
consequences of the two new variations.
3.2 Wishers with Continuous observations (New model
1))
When we have wishers who make statements in the form of their continuous
choice, we have the case where each agent i believes there is one true optimal
choice, A or B. And, instead of observing only the favorite choice of agent j,
agent j provides as information its own probability pj that A is the best choice.
Communication, therefore is a continuous value, just as in the BC models. The
difference is that, while any probability value can be a representation of the
agent point of view and communicated, there is the underlying assumption that
only p = 0 or p = 1 (and no other value) can be the correct answers. The
simplest model for this case is to assume a simple likelihood for the value pj
agent j communicates, if A is the best choice (as there are only two choices, we
only need to worry about one). For the bounded continuous variable, a natural
choice is to use a Beta distribution Be(pj |α, β) as likelihood, where
Be(pj |α, β) =
1
B(α, β)
pα−1j (1− pj)
β−1
where B(α, β) is obtained from Gamma functions by
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α+ β)
.
This choice makes the application of Bayes Theorem quite simple. Assuming
agent j information has some value, it is to be expected that α and β are such
that E[Be(pj |α, β)] > 0.5. This translates, in the likelihood to the condition
that α > β. Applying Bayes Theorem and using the same transformation to
logodds νi as in the CODA model
νi = ln
(
pi
1− pi
)
,
we obtain the very simple dynamics
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + (α− β)νj . (1)
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Figure 1: Distribution of the logodd opinions νi after t interactions per agent.
This is similar to the CODA dynamics (where we would have νi(t + 1) =
νi(t) + δ, with a fixed δ), except that now, at each step, instead of adding a
term that is constant in size, we add a term that is proportional to the log-oods
νj of the opinion of the neighbor j. This means that the system should also
tend to the extreme values, in opposition to the BC models where verbalization
was also continuous but the agents were mixers. Here, as νj increases, so will
the change in each step, making the long term increase in νi no longer linear.
Simulations were prepared to confirm the full effect of this change when each
agent only interacts with a fixed neighborhood. Square lattices with periodic
boundary conditions and von Neumann neighborhood were used and the state of
the system observed after different average number of interactions t per agent.
During the initial stages, we observe a behavior very similar to that of the
CODA model, with a clear appearance of domains for both possible choices.
However, instead of freezing, those domains keep changing and expanding and,
eventually, one of the options emerge as victorious and the system arrives at a
consensus.
Figure 1 shows histograms with the observed distributions for νi. The im-
portant thing to notice there is how the scale of typical values for νi changes
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with time. In the original CODA model, the extremist peaks, after the same
number of average interactions per agent, corresponded to νi around 430 (that
is around 500 steps away from changing opinions, with the size of the step deter-
mined by a = 70%). That value was already quite extreme since it corresponded
to probabilities of around 10−300. Now, however, instead of peaks of νi around
−430, we can see at 1 we reach νi values in the order of 10
215, corresponding to
the exponential increase in νi predicted by Equation 1.
Indeed, the system as a whole observes a surprisingly fast appearance of
extremists. After as little as 5 average interactions per agents, we have opinions
so extreme that it would have taken 100 CODA model interactions to obtain.
The lack of freezing in the domains is actually due to these ever increasing
opinions. As one side domain randomly gets a much larger value of νi, this
strength is enough to move the border freely and eventually, one of the options
wins.
3.3 Mixers with Discrete Observations (New Model 2)
The last remaining model to study is the opposite of the previous one. Now,
each agent only states its best bet on which of A or B should make a larger part
of the optimal answer. Unlike CODA or the previous model, instead of trying
to determine which option is the best, the agent is trying to find the correct
mixture of both choices. That is, we can no longer talk about a probability
pi agent i assigns to A being the optimal choice (and 1 − pi for B). Instead,
we need to have a continuous probability distribution gi(f) over the values
0 ≤ f ≤ 1 for each agent i and a rule for the agent to make its choice based
on this distribution. The simplest rule is that the agent communicates its best
guess, based on whether the expected value of f is larger or smaller than 0.5.
As the agent tries to determine the optimal frequency fi, this problem can
be seen as a very simple problem of inference on the probability of a Binomial
random draw. Once again, the Be(fj |α, β) distribution is useful, except this
time, it is the natural choice for the prior opinion gi(f), since it is the conjugate
distribution to the Binomial likelihood. The values of αi and βi now represent
the belief of the agent i and the average estimate is very easily obtained from
αi
αi+βi
. That basically means the agent j states it thinks a larger proportion of
A is preferable if αj > βj , and a larger proportion of B corresponds to αj < βj .
The update rule one obtains is also trivially simple. If i observes j has a
preference for A, it alters its distribution by making
αi(t+ 1) = αi(t) + 1
and it keeps βi constant. If it observes j chooses B, then αi is unchanged and
we have
βi(t+ 1) = βi(t) + 1
What is interesting here is that, while the values of the internal probability
can be quite different, the qualitative rule for when the opinion of one agent
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changes from A to B is exactly the same as in the CODA model. Indeed, the
above rule is equivalent to adding or subtracting one to α − β, depending on
whether A or B is observed. And the opinion changes when α−β changes sign.
That is the exact rule of the CODA model, except its dynamics was based on the
logodds ν. As the actual dynamics of ν could be renormalized to increments
of size 1, both models will yield, given the same initial conditions and same
random number generator, the exact same path in terms of configuration of
choices on the lattice. On the other hand, in the original CODA, probabilities
change much faster. For example, if after 500 interactions, one specific agent
had made 465 observations favoring A and 35 favoring B, we have seen that
the the effect of these 430 total steps for A meant the probability 1 − p of B
being the best option goes all the way down to 10−300. Here, if we start with
α ≈ β ≈ 1 (a choice close to uncertainty), we will have an average proportion
for A of 466/502, something close to 93%. From this point, it would take the
same number of influences in favor of B to change agent i decision towards B as
it would have taken in the original CODA, that is 430 interactions favoring B.
The opinion on which side should be more important is equally hard to change.
But the very strong extremism we had observed there is gone, replaced by a
reasonable estimate that the optimal proportion should still have a little of B
(7%).
3.4 Communication or Assumptions: Comparing the Four
Models
To make comparing the four cases easier, I have run a series of simulations where
every agent can interact with all the others, randomly drawing an agent j to
observe at each interaction. That means all the systems will eventually reach
consensus. The idea is to avoid any consequences of locality and focus only
on how the strength of the opinions evolve. In all cases, the initial conditions
included half of the agents showing some form of preference for each case. The
magnitude of the difference in the evolution of the opinions can be better grasped
in the graphics shown in Figure 2. For the case where we have wishers and
discrete communication, the strength of opinion increases so fast that it is simply
impossible to show its evolution in the same graphic as the other two cases. If
we get the other two cases in the same graphic in a way that their evolution can
be observed, the wishers with discrete communication soon move out of range.
Therefore, each case is shown in its own graphic. In order to understand the
graphic better, note that odds of 1 to 10 translate to values of ν = 2.3; 1 to 100
corresponds to ν = 4.6; 1 to 1,000 is ν = 6.9, and so on.
What we see is that the difference between wishers and mixers is probably a
crucial key to prevent extremism. Interestingly, for mixers, when they observe
choices and not the internal probability, that still allows them to get opinions
that do become stronger with time. When they do observe the continuous
evaluations, we have the results of the Bounded Confidence models, even if
we do a Bayesian version of the problem [90]. And, in this case, if no trust
considerations are introduced, as it is the case of the other results here, the
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Figure 2: Evolution of the average value of strength of the opinion, measured
by ν = p
1−p as a function of time. Time is measured in average interactions
per agent and each point corresponds to the average value of 20 realizations of
the problem. Due to the extreme difference in values, the evolution could not
be visually shown in the same graphic. The upper left graphic corresponds to
temporal evolution of a population of wishers with discrete communication, that
is, the regular CODA model; the upper right, we have mixers with with discrete
communication (new model 2); while both graphics in the lower line show the
case of wishers with continuous communication (new model 1), at left, just its
evolution to 1/10 of the time the previous cases evolved, at right, its evolution
for the whole range of times.
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average opinion ν will always stay around zero (p = 0.5) for an initially random
population, the exact opposite of extremism. That is, observing the amount of
existing uncertainty make mixers estimate the actual proportion of support for
each idea in the population. When they only state their preferences, random
effects, even if small, do make one of those preferences obtain a little more
support and, as a consequence, the perceived optimal mixture shifts to favoring
that one random choice. But we still never get to real extreme values.
The exact opposite effect is observed for wishers. In this case, just observing
the choice of their neighbors make their opinions already strong enough to be
described as very extreme. While we might have expected that observing the
uncertainty or, in other terms, doubt on the part of the other agents would lead
them to some amount of doubt and, therefore, less extremism, this was not the
case at all. The effect we observed for wishers can be described better in two
steps. Observing doubt just once could mean a smaller change in the proba-
bility the agent assigns to the best option (this can be easily adjusted by the
model parameters). But in the long run, the opinions get stronger as constant
reinforcement happens. Even if we start the system with smaller increases, as
the agents observe their peers becoming more confident, their opinions start
changing faster. It makes sense, as people with stronger opinions are expected
to have a stronger influence. And that is where the problem starts because
there is no limit on how strong those influences can become. At some point, the
change in opinions will become as strong as it would have been if only the choice
had been observed. From there, opinions will still keep increasing, making those
changes larger and larger with each interaction. This influence actually grows
exponentially and, given time, we can observe the absurd increase in certainty
we see in Figure 2.
The message from these models is clear. Mixers opinions seem to never grow
as strongly as the those of wishers. Indeed, either they will not grow at all, as
in Bounded Confidence models, or they will approach certainty (a mixture with
frequencies of f = 1 or 0) due to random effects causing one option to receive
a greater amount of support. But even then, we only observe ν growing loga-
rithmically. On the other hand, wishers always observe a strong growth of the
probability as shown by the linear or exponential growth of ν, depending on how
communication happens. Surprisingly, uncertainty in communication can even
make their opinions much stronger in the longer run, even if it might have had
some short term benefits. And all of these results were obtained without even
considering the very real problem that, as a person opinion becomes stronger,
she will probably start disregarding opinions that disagree with her own.
Those results bring some remarkable evidence on how to deal with extreme
opinions. Changing the way we communicate might not prevent extreme views
at all, and if we do not consider long term effects, it might even make things
worse in the long run. We should notice that, in the cases studied here, the
strengthening of the opinions happened only by social influence, no observations
of the world were ever made. That means that there was no real reason for the
system as a whole to go to such extremes as there was no real data confirming
either possibility. The problem with unwarranted extreme opinions seems to be
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deeply connected with the way we think. It is a consequence of our wish to find
one truth, of our desire to believe and take the side of one option, even in cases
where, at the beginning, every agent had mild and easily changeable positions.
The message this exercise in Opinion Dynamics adds to this paper conclu-
sions is clear. Not only our self-defining beliefs make us unable to think correctly
and consider all evidence as well as not being supported by any kind of rational
thought. This tendency to pick sides also make our opinions absurdly stronger
than they should be. This tendency seems to be at the very heart of why ex-
tremism arises. The agents in these simulations were willing to change their
opinions given enough influence to show them wrong. Even under these ideal-
ized conditions, the simple desire to have one option as the best answer already
caused severe problems, making opinions absurdly and unwarrantedly strong.
This only reinforces the evidence we had, from Cognitive Psychology as well
as both Deductive and Inductive Logic, that we should not take sides. Indeed,
that conclusion just became stronger: we should not even want to take sides.
In the next Section, we leave the study of extremism behind and I will inspect
the consequences of our wrong tendency to belief by discussing the effects this
bias causes on the ways we make Science.
4 Scientific choices, beliefs, and problems
4.1 Creating and Evaluating Theories
The na¨ıve description of the scientific enterprise, the one to which most of the
public and most of the scientists probably subscribe to is that it is the job
of Science to find the one truth about the world. Often, scientists actually
believe they have done just that. And we have learned earlier here that this
will make them unreliable sources about the ideas they defend. But even when
they recognize that we still are far from knowing it all, that our current ideas
might be the best ones we have but are only tentative descriptions, they still
often expect that one day we will create that one winning theory, the Grand
Unification that will explain everything. That might come to pass, of course.
But we are nowhere near it and, given all we have seen so far, I am forced to
question how much of our human failures might be influencing the reliability of
the Science we do today. And, if there are problems, what can we do to mitigate
them.
The desire to have one winning theory, the one idea that will rule them
all, the assumption that it is possible to find that idea, as we have seen, ought
to have consequences. When using inductive methods, it might actually be
the case that a mixture of the available theories does a much better job than
each one individual idea can do by itself. And, in any case, ideas are to be
ranked by how probable they are, not discarded nor can we prove them right.
They do not win or lose in absolute senses, even if they can still get arbitrarily
close to that. We have just seen in Section 3 that when we look for the one
correct idea, our estimates can become too strong, stronger than they should be.
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And that considering mixtures can actually lead to much weaker, less extreme
opinions, even when all agents end up agreeing with each other. Our opinions
should probably be quite less strong than they are, especially in the cases when
scientists engage in hot debates about who is right, assuming that the truth
must be with just one group of them. In some rare cases, when there is strong
evidence that neither idea does a perfect work, we actually have seen the survival
and acceptance of a mixture of even incompatible theories. Such is the case
of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity, as each of them describes a
different set of observations with what is considered remarkable accuracy and
fail at explaining the phenomena the other theory describes. But this reasonably
peaceful cohabitation of the minds of the researchers seems to be a rare case,
forced by the utter failure of each theory to provide decent predictions for the
set of experiments where the other one meets its greatest successes. And also
for the amazing successes in predictions that both theories have met in their
own field of applications. It would be good to look at this example and think
that the scientists are working as they should, but they actually never had a
choice under this combination of circumstances. And physicists still look for the
one theory that will unify them both, as they should do. The amazing success
of physical theories is both a very luck case that allows physicists to ignore
most considerations about mixture of ideas and probabilistic induction (we will
see why bellow) and also a curse that has prevented them from learning those
exact same lessons. And that means they still believe in the eventual blind
acceptance of the one theory that might never come. And, even if it does, our
current logical apparatus does not allow us to be certain, even if we actually
had the exact correct description of the Universe. That is, as far as we know,
an unavoidable human limitation.
When we think about how scientists should behave, we realize we have always
had idealized prescriptions about how the nature and demands of the scientific
work. Standards are extremely important, of course. And, given the enormous
success of the scientific enterprise, it used to make sense to assume that indi-
vidual scientists did not deviate much from the norms of the area. Some of
them certainly did, but errors and deceptions ought to be the exception, right?
However, since the first observations of how scientists actually work with their
ideas, it has become very clear that we do not follow the norms people believed
we did. And that happened even among people working in some of our greatest
technical feats, such as the Apollo missions [96]. The departure of the idealized
norm seemed to be so prevalent that the personnel in those missions considered
normal that people they kept respecting intellectually could hold dogmatic posi-
tions and not be convinced of their erroneous views even by data. Scientists and
high-level technicians are not different from the rest of mankind and they also
defend their ideas. And that should actually be no surprise to anyone working
in a scientific area.
Feyerabend[97] observed, from historical cases as well as his own interactions
with working scientists, that the typical behavior did not match the ideas he
had been told were the right way to do Science. His observations were quite
influential and have even led people to think the whole reliability of the scientific
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enterprise could be seriously compromised. A shortened version of the rules he
investigated if we actually obeyed are the tentative norms that scientists should
not use ad hoc hypotheses, nor try ideas that contradict reliable experimental
results, nor use hypotheses that diminished the content of other empirically ad-
equate hypotheses, neither propose inconsistent hypothesis. And yet, he found
evidence that all these norms that, at first sight did sound reasonable, were
broken on a daily basis. More than that, important advances had been achieved
exactly because those rules had been broken. If those rules were indeed the
source of Science credibility, it would have looked as if there was no longer any
reason at all to place more trust in scientific knowledge than in any other form
of knowledge.
But that is not really the case. One of his main conclusions, that all ideas
are worth pursuing, is, quite contrary to what he believe, actually a prescription
of a number of inductive methods. Instead of limiting the ideas that should be
tested, inductive methods actually support the exact concept that every idea
must be kept, tested as a possibility, and ranked. And, once again the fact that
we are limited plays an important role. We can not know every possible idea
and demonstration in advance, or ever. For us, limited humans, the need to test
all ideas actually means that we must work to get more and more ideas created.
Only that way we can add them to our space of possible descriptions. Most of
them will be utter failures, with probabilities so close to zero that they will be
indeed useless. But we only know that after we come up with them and verify
if they match the world we live in.
If we want real probabilities and not only odd ratios between two ideas, Bay-
seian methods actually require, for the ideal situation, that we should consider
all possible explanations [98]. Similarly, Solomnoff method for induction [66]
requires a theoretical computer that would be able to generate every possible
program, up to infinite length, and average over all of programs that produce
as output the data we already know about a problem. While both approaches
are obviously impossible, they do provide the ideal situation. As we work to get
closer to the ideal, even if we will never reach, we have to realize that we must
indeed catalog all possible ideas, including those very same hypothesis Feyer-
abend had been taught to be forbidden. Obviously, hypotheses that contain
logical inconsistencies are not acceptable per se. But even those can be useful
as a middle step, if they inspire us to later obtain a consistent set of hypotheses,
by correcting initial problems and inconsistencies.
However, while generating the largest number of hypothesis is something
we should strive for, this prescription does not lead to any kind of relativism
at all, contrary to what Feyerabend’s followers would like to believe. We just
need them all to verify, as well as possible, which ideas actually match our
observations better. Not defending an idea means not disregarding any possible
theories as a possibility. But it is unavoidable that some of those theories will
turn out to describe the data so badly that, while their probabilities will not
be technically zero, they will so close to zero that we can safely disregard them
when making any statements. That is different from proving an idea wrong, from
an epistemic point of view, but the practical consequences can be exactly the
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same. In Science, the difference between proving an idea wrong and estimating
its very low probability is often just a mathematical distinction, with no real
consequences. As we have limited time and resources, too unlikely hypotheses
really ought to be disregarded as if they had been proven wrong.
This poses the question of how much we can get close to prove a theory
“wrong”. The answer can be illustrated by the classical observation of the ad-
vance of Mercury’s perihelion and why this experiment was seen as a “proof”
that Newtonian Mechanics had to be replaced by General Relativity. One im-
portant thing to notice before we start is that we are talking about two theories
that agree incredibly well with experiments, that have very close predictions in
many circumstances and that, as far as we know, provide predictions, in those
cases, that match experiments with amazing accuracy. However, there are in-
deed cases where they disagree in their predictions and, as those cases started to
be tested, there was no longer any doubts in the minds of the physicists about
which theory was superior. The subtle differences in where Mercury was when
it got closer to the Sun and how that varied over centuries was one of the first
very strong “proofs” that General Relativity was indeed better. So, why can
physicists use the term proof in these cases, even when no real proof exists.
What people knew when the two theories started competing was that when
we estimate every influence of the other planets on Mercury’s orbit using New-
tonian Mechanics, its perihelion should move 5577.18± 0.85 seconds of arc per
century. However, the actual observed displacement was 5599.74 ± 0.41 [99].
On the other hand, General Relativity introduced a correction of 43.03 to the
Newtonian prediction, bringing the actual estimate of the difference between
observed measurement and prediction from 42.96± 0.94 to 0.07± 0.94 (the er-
rors have been estimated by me simply adding the variances in Clemence article
and are, therefore, not much more than an educated guess). We have the New-
tonian prediction at a distance of 45.7 times the standard deviation from the
observation and the General Relativity at a distance of 0.07 standard deviations.
Therefore, if we assume the observed variations have a Normal distribution, the
likelihood ratio between the two theories will be
L =
e−
−0.07
2
2
e−
−45.72
2
=
0.9976
3.1× 10−454
= 3.2× 10453.
In other words, if you started by believing General Relativity had just one in a
billion chance to be a better description (1 in 109), you would end concluding
it was actually better by a chance around 1 in 10453−9 = 10444. It is very
important to notice that this calculation is heavily dependent on the assumption
that the errors would follow a Normal distribution, which is a rather thin-tailed
distribution (very distant values are extremely unlikely). If we do change the
distribution of the experimental errors to a distribution with much larger tails,
as for example, an arbitrary t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom, things
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change dramatically. In this case, the likelihood ratio would be now
L =
(
1 + 0.07
2
10
)
−11/2
(
1 + 45.7
2
10
)
−11/2
=
0.593
1.7× 10−13
= 3.5× 1012.
Now, an initial opinion of one in a billion against General Relativity would be
transformed in just 1 in 1,000 in favor of it. However, the change in opinion is
still quite impressive. And we must remember this was just one single exper-
iment. Since then, many other experiments have confirmed the predictions of
General Relativity. And we must now include the results of all these experi-
ments to obtain a final estimate. It is not difficult to see that the probability of
Newtonian Mechanics being correct is basically zero for all practical purposes.
Results in Physics have been so discriminating between competing theories in
most cases that physicists can work perfectly well if they assume they are proofs,
even though they are not real logical or mathematical proofs.
One thing to learn from the difference in the behavior of the likelihood ratios
is that the results can indeed depend heavily on the assumptions we make about
the nature of the experimental errors. Including both possible hypothesis on the
errors, along with many others, as we should, can complicate these raw estimates
quite severely and that is beyond our objectives in this article. Indeed, some
hypotheses about the errors will be more probable and that has to be taken
into account and we are soon in a deep sea of technical statistical problems.
For out purposes here, we just need to observe that a theory can really become
extremely unlikely to be true given data. For both calculations, the change in
probability was actually quite strong. Technically, that did not mean Newtonian
Mechanics probability was a mathematical zero. But we can say that it is so
ridiculously close to zero that saying it in any other way is really a waste of
effort, unless you are indeed a mathematician.
Notice also that this exercise was a comparison between only two theories.
Ideally, we should keep all possible alternatives at hand. But the vast majority of
other alternatives describe the data so much worse than the “wrong” Newtonian
Mechanics that we do not even bother to enumerate them. As I have mentioned
above, physicists have been quite lucky in the way data can discriminate between
competing ideas. When that happens, concerns about our limited reasoning
power are far more relevant than the prescription that all ideas should be kept.
Actual calculations of most possibilities can easily become too complicated to be
carried out if more and more hypothesis about the experiments are introduced
as well as more theories about the Mercury’s orbit and there is nothing to gain
from those. It does make perfect practical sense to just keep those theories that
seem reasonable enough at the moment.
On the other hand, Feyerabend conclusion that we must keep generating
new ideas, no matter how well they initially match what we know right now,
was actually normatively correct. This has some interesting consequences that
people seldom consider. One of them is the actual strong usefulness of the
existence of purely theoretical scientists. They are already a major part of
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the culture in the physical sciences and they also exist in some areas of Biology,
such as Evolution. Having people dedicated solely to coming up with new better
ideas means we can generate those needed ideas faster. Advances can appear
faster and the areas where they exist are bound to benefit from their specialized
knoweldge.
There is also incidental and very strong benefits from having a large number
of people who do not make experiments or generate any data. And that is the
simple fact that the people who will check their ideas are not the same as the
proponents of the theories, allowing for a much less personally-biased analysis.
The current tendency to demand that people produce the ideas and the data
that supports those ideas can result into biased choices of sets of data. Data
that comes together with a new idea is seldom reliable at all. There are reasons
for that to happen related to how some areas do bad statistical analysis and bad
practices for accepting papers, but we should also not ignore the fact that human
reasoning is deeply flawed. Even while trying to be honest, scientists will suffer
from confirmation biases and their reasoning will probably try to deceive them
into creating arguments that favor the ideas they support. Someone proposing
the idea and providing the tests for it is actually a very strong moral hazzard
that we should try to diminish. While scientists might not be used to the idea of
moral hazzards, we are not immune to them. We really should build our areas
in a way that makes it less easy to happen. Having pure theorists is not only
a good idea about dividing the work and generating needed new ideas faster.
It is also a good idea because it avoids ethical problems in data analysis, as
well as human biases and our tendency to defend our own ideas. Of course, the
existence of theorists require that we know enough about a specific problem that
we can start generating several theories and this might not be the case yet for
some areas of knowledge. Still, having a number of individuals solely dedicated
to pure theoretical work and some exclusively dedicated to experimental issues
is quite likely something each area should strive for, even if that might not be
possible today in every field of knowledge.
Another incidental and very important benefit from having theorists comes
exactly from all our reasoning failures. Expecting our brains and our arguments
to help us arrive at conclusions we can trust is, at the very best, a foolhardy
proposition, as it should be clear now. On the other hand, a recent study
on judicial rulings has shown that it seems that legal training and experience
can provide some resistance to identity-protective cognition. Unfortunately,that
resistance only applied to the situations about legal reasoning for which the
judges had been trained[100]. This suggests that it is possible to train people
to make decisions that are close to neutrality, at least on matters that are clear,
logical applications of already known ideas. It seems to me that a central aspect
of this training effect might come as a consequence that legal training is indeed
based on a series of well defined rules and, therefore, its members can learn to
apply those rules and avoid normal human biases. This seems no different from
the fact that, while we naturally fail miserably at simple logical problems, we
are very good at solving them when they happen in an everyday situation.
We should also remember that there are several experiments that show that
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professionals actually fail at their own tasks and at evaluating their own rate
of success when they do not have access to fact-correcting strategies. This
highlights the fact that simple training alone is not enough. We need training,
we need to learn when we are making mistakes and, whenever possible, we
need to making thinking tools to correct our human nature. Mathematics and
Logic play exactly that role. And it is a role that is probably similar to the
legal training that judges receive and allow them to identify which cases should
be treated in which way. For scientific knowledge, Mathematics plays exactly
the role of thinking in the sciences where we have been able to successfully
apply it. A mathematical or logical demonstration is not subject to our biases,
since anyone with the proper training will find mistakes that are not too subtle
and hard and expose any errors. It is not Mathematics that is unreasonably
effective [101], it is the standard for comparison, our own reasoning, that is
far poorer than we would like to admit. This importance of having logically
sound reasoning in every field of knowledge makes the existence of classes of
scientists specialized in applying mathematical tools to the exploration of each
area another very strong defense against human failings. In particular, given
the complexity of the task, theorists are a necessity in this case, since it is not
reasonable to expect one single individual to master the intricacies of a fully
developed area and its theories as well as the many difficulties associated with
data gathering and analysis.
The need for the creation and acceptance of new ideas as part of the theoret-
ical repertoire of an area has at least another important consequence, probably
far more important than the ones I have described above. While individuals
might have difficulty accepting ideas that contradict their favorite theories, we
must make it sure that this difficulty must not happen in any area as a whole.
Cultural norms can help offset the bad behavior of the scientists [102], but we
do need to verify that there are social effects in each area that make the knowl-
edge generated by the area researchers more reliable. In every field, new ideas
should be always welcome or, at the very least, not forbidden, even though most
of them might prove to be very improbable. Unfortunately, the needed open-
ness to new theories might not be a common characteristic to all areas. Heavy
reliance on the use of authority figures, a need to show that someone has said
something similar before, these all too common practices can lead whole areas
to stop advancing. If agreement with what has already been said is expected,
even if researchers were not prone to human biases, we would expect advance
to come to a halt. Add the fact that we are all humans and will defend our
old positions and we are starting to head to a nightmare scenario. And, while
this problem seems to be more serious in the Humanities, it can actually be
observed everywhere. The refuse of many physicists to accept String Theory
as a theoretical construct on the basis that it does not provide new predictions
is epistemologically absurd, even more when we consider that its predictions
actually work, since the identical predictions that already existed work. The
problem many people see with String Theory is that it just provides, for the
experiments we can do, the same predictions of the older models. This goes di-
rectly against the belief physicists have that there will be only one theory. And,
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as humans, they feel the urge to defend that random belief. Ironically, from an
inductive point of view, the truth is that having more than one theory providing
the same predictions is actually epistemologically useful. This is easier to see
using Solomonoff framework. There, more identical predictions generated by
different program makes those exact predictions more probable [66]! And that
actually means that the predictions of those theories in Physics become a little
more reliable, which should be considered a good thing. But String Theory does
poses a problem to the side many physicists chose to take on philosophical and
metaphysical issues.
Finally, it is worth noticing that we already have some simulation evidence
that, if social influence becomes too strong, an area might fail to replace an
old theory for a better one [103, 104]. The habit of constantly referring and
excessive citing of old works is, indeed, something that should be considered at
least very worrisome. It basically just reinforces the already existing ideas and
this tradition can pose a strong barrier to the appearance of new theories. We
need to allow for those new theories to be created and developed to the point
they can be compared to reality. It does not matter if their predictions are not
new or if we might not like them or if they may sound too weird at start nor if
they go against what is the consensus in a given field. Competence is always a
need, of course, but that is the only requirement of the scientific game. A good
part of what makes an area trustworthy might be just its ability to allow the
appearance of the new, the creation of ever new competitors for the position of
the best description we currently have.
4.2 Tests and the Desire to Know
Of course, not only openness to new ideas matter. Simple competence is of
fundamental importance, and one aspect of being competent is our competence
in data analysis. This is paramount to any reliability of the conclusions. But
the history of the use of statistical methods in areas as Medicine and Psychology
is one where competence was traded for ease of use. And, in this case, the ease
of use was also deeply associated with our desire to find ideas to accept and
defend. While statistical tools have been developed to points where many of
them might not be described as easy, many of those tools have been created as
statisticians were prey to our human tendencies. Give me an idea to defend is
a recurrent theme in the development of the area. And that had to lead to a
new set of problems.
Actually, things have become so out of control that there is good reason to
consider most results of these areas as unreliable [105]. The causes are not only
statistical methods but also the lack of deeper statistical knowledge from pro-
fessionals in the areas where the problem is more severe, coupled to absolutely
damaging politics from the journals about when to accept an experiment paper
and when not to. Still, it is clear now that the use of methods that reject ideas
is at the very heart of the observed problems. Once more, I have to repeat
that we need all ideas. And since we have serious psychological biases when we
decide in favor of a specific idea, accepting and rejecting theories or hypotheses
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is a very bad way to do Science, even if we did not know that. Once again,
it is worth remembering that, during practical applications, a choice might be
needed. A physician, after diagnosing a patient, might have a number of ill-
nesses that fit the data and different, incompatible treatments for each disease.
In this case, not only the probability that each diagnosis is the right one should
be considered but also the severity of the consequences of each choice. A full
decision procedure is needed and that will often mean, in practical terms, to
behave as if one of the possibilities were the true one. But this is true only for
the decision about which medicine to prescribe. The physician must actually
keep all the alternatives as possible explanations in mind and update the prob-
abilities as the case advances and more observations become available. This
can mean changing the initial decision as more is learned. Decisions can ignore
possibilities, the knowledge states of our minds must not.
That means that any data analysis that wants to avoid generating biases
in the scientists and readers minds should not include statements that could
sound as if we were pointing at one idea as the correct one nor at one idea
as the wrong one. More specifically, we should avoid any kind of hypothesis
testing, regardless of its statistical basis. Instead, ideally, we should just point
to which ideas are or seem more probable or, when that is not feasible just
present and provide useful summaries of the data. An article that estimates
rough probabilities is not a problem, if it is clear the estimates are rough. The
same is valid for an article that only shows the characteristics of the data and
how it varies. Strong statements with no very clear estimate of uncertainty
are problematic. This prescription is something different researchers have been
obtaining as they study the many errors associated with bad statistics and how
it interacts with publishing practices. That the absurdly disastrous practice
of some areas where most journals would only publish results with “strong”
p−values has led to nefarious consequences due to publication bias is something
we already know [105]. But more recently, we have observed many scientists
also pointing the serious problems that arise from making tests, regardless of
whether the journals would publish all experiments or just a severely biased
collection of them.
The good news is that the misuse of several statistical tools and the conse-
quences of such misuse have finally been described as a serious problem[106]. In
Medicine, cautionary articles about this misuse exist for more than two decades
[107]. The widespread, unthinking, and stupid practice of using p-values as a
way to avoid thinking about the statistical problem has been correctly labeled as
surrogate science [108]. Warnings about how p-values can be useless have been
already published [109]. In order to still be able to use the existing reported
p-values in the already existing literature in a non-testing manner, some correct-
ing techniques have been proposed [110]. Unfortunately, while they make sense
from a statistical point of view, they can not correct for the fact that the re-
ported values we have in print are useless, as they are also the consequence of the
publication biases. Sadly, the decade old conclusion that most published results
are false in the areas that make widespread use of these tools [111] seems to be
still a valid conclusion today. The need to completely abandon null-hypothesis
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significance testing has been already acknowledged [112] but the suggestion to
simply change it for confidence (or credibility) intervals is not necessarily an
improvement from the point of view of the reader of the published information
who might still read it as strong support to one idea [113]. On the other hand,
acknowledgment of the dangers of null-hypothesis significance testing have fi-
nally reached the point where the method has simply been banned from at least
one journal [114], so things are improving, albeit slowly. It is clear however that
the misuse of Statistics in the literature is not limited to problems with tests
and p-values and represent a much larger problem with competence in general
[115]. But tests do sound too much as taking sides. As such, you should not al-
low humans to use them, under penalty of obtaining unreliable analysis. Either
from the statisticians or from the readers of those analysis.
For all we have learned here, I must suggest that an important part of the
how we can correct our errors is to understand the evils of our desire for possibly
non-existent final answers. That desire is why hypothesis tests were created in
the first place, to rule out ideas, despite the ever obvious fact that this ruling
out never meant that we knew which hypothesis was true. But the terminology
seemed to imply we did, with rejection or non-rejection, as well as acceptance
of ideas the normal way people mention those statistical results. While the only
truth is that data only makes some ideas more probable and others less probable,
with cases where we can indeed stop worrying, when probabilities actually go
down to basically zero. Estimating the actual probabilities might be too difficult
for many problems. How to do it is often an open problem for researchers in
Statistics, but the fact remains that choosing sides about hypothesis is most
of the time completely unwarranted. Researchers must understand as soon as
possible that statistical techniques do not provide magical answers; they will
just point at more probable answers, not at the true ones. Epistemologically,
no idea should ever be rejected.
5 Discussion
Changing from normal, committed beliefs to probabilistic, uncertain beliefs
might not be easily done. Our societies and our institutions are currently built
around the concept that ideas should be defended. We teach our kids to stand
for what they believe, we teach them that debating means defending instead of
analyzing ideas. But it should be clear now that the fact that we have always
done that does not mean this is the best way to do things. What we have seen
here strongly supports the idea that we should start learning as soon as possible
that ideas are to be challenged, never supported. They can be often safely dis-
carded, as probabilities fly to zero. But openness to change is paramount. This
is a concept that scientists have always claimed to follow, even though we do not
do that with our own theories. It might be useful to distinguish in our language
the two types of beliefs, supporting unwarranted beliefs from probabilistic ones,
to make it clear that they are not the same. They do not have the same effects,
they are far distant in their consequence. Probabilistic beliefs are correct while
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committed beliefs make us stupid.
Probabilistic beliefs (peliefs?) are normatively acceptable. By claiming a
probability we are not committing ourselves to an idea, at least not so strongly.
It becomes much easier later to accept those ideas were wrong. The consequence
of this simple fact is almost obvious and yet, almost unsaid. Socrates sounds
like he had grasped it, when he used to claim he had no knowledge about the
world, but we have kept making this same mistake throughout the millennia
since then. We should not teach anyone to debate and support an idea, we
should teach people to look for mistakes in all the sides of the discussion. We
should not think that one political side will have the right ideas and should be
supported against the wrong side. It is perfectly possible and sometimes very
likely that one of the sides will be correct more often than the other side. But
chances are that good and bad ideas will come from both sides.
We defend points of view in our work, regardless of the field of activity, when
we have no valid reason to expect that we would be always right. Accepting
that the ideas we consider probable do not define who we are might be an
important step. The things I believe about how the world is are just my best
guess. Sometimes a very well educated guess, sometimes a wild guess, but they
are always just a probabilistic guess. It is fundamental to acknowledge that
they might just be wrong. At best, it is my fallible opinion that they are likely
to be the current best option. And we all must admit that we will often be very
wrong. Our human nature will make that a certainty.
There will be cases when taking sides will be unavoidable. Moral issues
might be an important exception to the rule of never taking sides. We do not
know there is a right moral answer and, while the vast majority of us will agree
on many basic ideas, it is not clear that there are right answers. Much less so for
those ideas where we disagree. Defending your own moral values might not be a
problem, assuming you do know them perfectly well and that they do not suffer
from logical inconsistencies. However, a significant part of the political and
economical discussion is not about morals, it is about which programs will work
better. When that happens, taking sides will only prevent us from learning. It
is destructive. Once we understand the problem, it becomes clear that the costs
are too high for us to accept that this behavior should continue. Unfortunately,
there will also be times when taking sides about descriptions of the real world
will be the best decision, given the circumstances. When people argue against
vaccines, or that evolution is only a theory (the example on General Relativity
should make it abundantly clear that some theories become even more probably
than any single experimental result), or any number of “crazy” ideas we see
everyday, we often have too much data showing that they are wrong. Under
some circumstances, we are actually in the cases where one of the probabilities
has gone to basically zero. And then, accepting the death of little children or the
spread of unsupported world views, just for the sake of a trivial reminder that
10−100 is technically (and only technically) not zero, would make no sense at all.
Public discussion is a realm of incompetence and, in those case, simply stating
the competent view will mean taking sides. Sadly a lot of incompetence comes
from very intelligent minds who have just not educated themselves properly on
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everything they should know.
Science is hard and any field takes years to master. If you are going to speak
about it, it should be a moral obligation to actually know what you are talking
about and why people disagree with you. In particular, when you take sides,
our human nature makes you stupid and you should remember that there is
evidence that, the more intelligent you are, the more stupid taking sides will
make you. It is appalling to see the double standards that come from taking
sides. For example, pointing that pharmaceutical industries are out there to
make money is a basically correct statement, their claims must indeed be met
with suspicion. And yet, an absurd number of people just fail to see that the
alternatives they defend do exactly the same, that their proponents are also
making money and gaining prestige from their defenders. This blindness to the
problems of any sides you choose to defend is a consequence of you choosing
those sides and suffering from the fact that our reasoning is not meant to reach
the truth. Its function is to defend the ideas you chose, at the cost of the truth.
The need to change the way we debate should be clear by now. Taking sides
makes us stupid. The more intelligent we are, the better equipped we are to
defend our ideas and, paradoxically, the more stupid our beliefs will make us.
Worse yet, our current way to believe does not just make it harder to get to
the best answer, as if that was not already a terrible problem. There is very
good reason to think that the concept that there must be a correct answer is
at the very core of the raise of extremist positions, even when everyone starts
with doubts. Belief and belonging are very probably the main motor behind
ideological violence. By changing what we consider to be acceptable ways of
discourse, we might also contribute strongly not only to faster advances and
technologies, but also to a safer world. I believe or, more exactly, I strongly
’pelieve’ that, if we start paying attention to when we and others have group
defining beliefs and if we start denouncing that behavior in ourselves and in
others, there is a strong chance we will diminish the problems I have identified
here.
Of course, the concept that we must not take sides also has consequences on
how we researchers interact with our own scientific practice, as we have seen.
We have been making mistakes in all fields of knowledge. While those mistakes
have luckily been completely inconsequential in areas as Physics, they have been
very costly in other fields of knowledge. Our desire to take sides is problematic
and it is not an exaggeration to claim it has cost many lives, since we have
serious problems on the published results of areas such as Medicine. In the
Humanities, the constant struggle between ideologies has certainly prevented
the much needed advance of our knowledge. And, indeed, it actually means
that it is close to impossible to figure out who might be right at any specific
issue. Taking sides and defending ideas has rendered the opinion of researchers
completely useless and it is hard to find neutral voices that could provide some
amount of trust to their analysis. Incompetence can always be detected, of
course. But when arguments become more solid and sophisticated, the fact that
there is no logical and mathematical foundations we can use to check them in a
way that is independent of our severely biased human argumentation actually
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means that it is not possible to even guess who is right. For anyone interested
in the very important issues of the area, as we all should be, this is a major
disaster. Work that simply describes situations is probably less prone to the
problem, although the biases of the researchers might still compromise even
those.
Accepting that we have no choice but to live with uncertainty might be a
first step. Ideas can only be ruled out when this is a necessity for a practical
decision to be made. Practical considerations do, of course, include our lim-
ited brain power and the cases where probability is so near zero that we really
have nothing to worry about when discarding some ideas. But, somewhere in
our descriptions of the area those ideas must be kept, except for the common
cases where probabilities are absurdly small. Even then, we do have studies in
the history of scientific thought where all old discarded ideas should survive,
just in case we need them further along the path. Theories can indeed be so
improbable that saying some of them are just plain wrong is a very minor, com-
pletely inconsequential abuse of language. It is the epistemological equivalent
of treating distant objects as points in Physics. We know it is an approximation
but we also know it is needed, the benefits far surpassing any possible precision
problem.
Another significant thing to remember is how the simple wish to obtain
the one true answer has led the opinions of the agents to absurd extremes.
The simulations are clearly not a representation of the whole process of human
thinking. But the strength of the results does suggest that the difference between
wishers, who want to find one true idea, and mixers, who accept that they might
need to live with a mixture of ideas coming from different theories, might be
a fundamental problem. Changing the model assumptions is still needed in a
future work to check for the robustness of these results, of course. But the
behavior we have observed in the models in this paper already poses significant
evidence that this distinction is probably a very important one. That means
that it is not only taking sides we should avoid. We must not even want to
take sides. As such, when you add the psychological already observed effects
to the quite probable problems arising from social interactions suggested by
the simulations, we must learn that we should never use techniques to choose
between ideas. That is also the case when the debate is purely scientific. Our
statistical techniques must be developed and chosen to deal with the problem
that arise from the fact that we are humans and quite fallible. As such, ranking
ideas is not a problem, while rejecting them can make both readers and scientists
victims to our own humanity.
It is also interesting to notice that some of the ideas that gave birth to the
most damaging forms of Relativism we have observed are actually correct. They
do not have the consequences people thought they have, however. But we do
need to allow for the development of every type of theory and ideas. The crucial
difference is that this actual need does not mean that all ideas are equal, not at
all. Most will have probabilities associated to them that are so small that they
will only survive as failed attempts at the theory-generating game. A few will
have better luck, when they describe parts of the world in a reasonable way.
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Still, the fact that we do need to test as many theories as possible means we
should indeed have theoretical scientists in every field of knowledge. We need
people who only propose ideas and evaluate their predictions, with no attempt
at all at checking their validity. And we need people who specialize in only
checking those predictions also, people who has much less to lose when ideas
turn out to be wrong. If those who run the experiments are different people,
their observations and conclusions become far more trustworthy. Science must
come to terms with our human shortcomings, with our desire to defend our own
ideas and groups. And that means adopting new techniques to minimize those
problems. Each and every change that diminishes the influence each scientist
has on the acceptance of the ideas she defends, the better it will be for how
much we can trust our whole enterprise.
We used to think we lived at the center of the Universe. We used to think
we were not related to the animals. We used to think that we were governed by
our reason and that our emotions did not have a significant impact on us. It is
now time to realize that our reasoning is also deeply flawed. It does not work
the way we always thought it did and we can not trust our own arguments.
We can only learn to use tools to correct for the severe problems in our very
fallible reasoning. Those tools have brought us this far and they are what make
Science deserve some trust, while all other alternatives deserve none. Without
those tools, it seems that, every time we try to reason, we lie to others and we
lie to ourselves. We are that incompetent when we do not correct our biases.
For now, I leave the reader with the commandment of the title: “Thou shalt not
take sides”.
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